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Averroes: religious dialectic and
Aristotelian philosophical
thought

Abū al-Walı̄d Muh. ammad ibn Ah. mad ibn Muh. ammad ibn Rushd
(ca. 1126–98), who came to be known in the Latin West as Averroes,
was born at Cordoba into a family prominent for its expert devotion
to the study and development of religious law (shar‘ı̄a). In Arabic
sources al-H
. afı̄d (“the Grandson”) is added to his name to distinguish him from his grandfather (d. 1126), a famous Malikite jurist
who served the ruling Almoravid regime as qādı̄ (judge) and even as
imām (prayer leader and chief religious authority) at the magnificent
Great Mosque which still stands today in the city of Averroes’ birth
and where Averroes himself served as Grand Qādı̄ (chief judge). When
the governing regime changed with the success of ‘Abd al-Mu’min
(r. 1130–63), founder of the Almohad (al-Muwah. h. idūn) dynasty, the
members of the family continued to flourish under a new religious
orientation based on the teachings of the reformer, al-Mah. dı̄ ibn
Tūmart (d. ca. 1129–30). Although insistent on the strict adherence to
religious law, Ibn Tūmart’s teachings were at the same time equally
insistent on the essential rationality of human understanding of the
existence and unity (tawh. ı̄d) of God and his creation as well as the
rationality of the Qur’ān and its interpretation. This approach was
embraced – even exploited – by Averroes in his own writings on
dialectical theology and thereby played a role in the development of
his thought on the nature of religious law and revelation in relation
to philosophy founded on the powers of natural reason. Considerations of family, history, and contemporary religious doctrine play
roles in the thought of other philosophical thinkers presented in this
volume, but in the case of Averroes his times and his various appointments at Seville and Cordoba as qādı̄ seem to have melded in special
ways with his understanding of Aristotle and al-Fārābı̄. Over the
180
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short period of 1179–81 he propounded publicly his controversial
views on religion and natural reason in four important dialectical
works: the so-called Decisive Treatise, the Explanation of the Sorts
of Proofs in the Doctrines of Religion (al-Kashf ‘an al-manāhij), a
D
. amı̄ma or Appendix on Divine Knowledge usually understood as
attached to the Decisive Treatise, and his famous Incoherence of
the Incoherence written as a commentary on and response to alGhazālı̄’s Incoherence of the Philosophers. In these compositions,
Averroes is a thinker dynamically engaged with religious issues,
working out a coherent account of matters of relevance to both religion and philosophy. The dynamism of his thought is also apparent
in another way in philosophical works where he changed views on a
number of issues, among them the nature of divine causality in the
world and the vexing problem of providing a coherent and cogent
account of human knowing and the role of the receptive human
material intellect.
The philosophical works of Averroes range in size from short treatises on specific issues of logic, physics, psychology, et alia to his
three sorts of commentaries on major works of the Aristotelian corpus. His Short Commentaries, usually considered early, consist of
epitomizing accounts of Aristotelian doctrines, often substantially
based on discussions in the accounts of commentators of the Greek
tradition.1 The Middle Commentaries more often have the form of
a clarifying and simplifying paraphrase of the Aristotelian text, and
for that reason are thought likely to arise in response to the request
of his patron, Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf, for help in understanding the works
of Aristotle. The late Long Commentaries, consisting of the entire
text of Aristotle divided into sections followed by detailed commentary, are generally thought to contain his most mature thought. The
first of these was the Long Commentary on the “Posterior Analytics”
(ca. 1180–3). Following in measured succession were Long Commentaries on the De Anima (ca. 1186?), on the Physics (1186), on the De
Caelo (1188), and on the Metaphysics (1190). As will be discussed
below, Averroes himself held that truth, not as grasped per accidens
by the methods of persuasion or dialectic, but in its fullest sense as
per se, is to be found in his “books of demonstration,”2 that is, in his
philosophical works and in particular his commentaries on Aristotle
which he held to be substantially composed of philosophical demonstrations. Through translations into Hebrew the work of Averroes
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had a very substantial influence on the development of medieval
Jewish philosophical thought. The works translated included the
Decisive Treatise, the Incoherence of the Incoherence, several Short
Commentaries, Middle Commentaries on the Physics, De Caelo, De
Anima, Metaphysics, and more, and the Long Commentaries on the
Posterior Analytics and Physics.3 It is particularly significant that
the Long Commentaries on the De Anima and on the Metaphysics
were not included, since these contain his final positions on soul,
intellect, and personal immortality as well as on God and the nature
of metaphysical science. Yet it is because of translations from Arabic
into Latin in the thirteenth century that Averroes is a widely recognized figure in the history of philosophy today. This early wave of
translations, many by Michael Scot, who worked in Toledo and in
Sicily at the court of Frederick II, were for the most part of philosophical commentaries and did not include his works of dialectical
argumentation relevant to religion. Averroes’ thought continued to
draw the attention of Western thinkers, and interest was reinforced
by a second wave of translations and the printing of his translated
works with those of Aristotle.4 No such intense interest in the works
and thought of Averroes was maintained in the Arabic philosophical
milieu of the Middle Ages.

religious dialectic and philosophy
Much philosophical confusion has arisen regarding the interpretation of the religious and philosophical thought of Averroes, oftentimes due to factors extraneous to his own work. Since the emergence of interest in Averroes broadly in the Arab world following
the appearance of Renan’s 1852 work, in some cases the writings
and figure of Averroes have been used in blatant manipulation, with
little if any regard to the genuine sense of his thought, to champion
many diverse causes from socialism and Marxism to nationalism
and more recently to promote the harmony of religion and rationality in the face of rising anti-rational Islamic fundamentalism.5 In
other cases, however, confusion has been due to the lack of access
to or consultation of the complete corpus of his works, while in still
others it has been due to confusion in the interpretation of doctrine
and texts. This latter has been particularly evident in regard to the
issue of the relation of philosophy and religion and the imputation
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to Averroes himself of the doctrine of “Double Truth” that is often
claimed to have arisen in the Latin West.6 Careful consideration of
Averroes’ methodology as expounded and employed in his dialectical works will show that imputation to be incorrect and will also
valuably set the stage for consideration of his strictly philosophical
work.
In the Incoherence of the Incoherence Averroes makes it clear
that the discussions of philosophical topics recounted in that work
should not be regarded as definitive accounts of his views. He also
remarks on the nature of statements set forth in that work:
All this is the theory of the philosophers on this problem and in the way
we have stated it here with its proofs, it is a persuasive not a demonstrative statement. It is for you to inquire about these questions in the places
where they are treated in the books of demonstration, if you are one of the
people of complete happiness (al-sa‘āda al-tāmma) and if you are one of
those who learn the arts the function of which is proof. For the demonstrative arts are very much like the practical; for just as a man who is not a
craftsman cannot perform the function of craftsmanship, in the same way
it is not possible for him who has not learned the arts of demonstration
to perform the function of demonstration which is demonstration itself:
indeed this is still more necessary for this art than for any other – and this
is not generally acknowledged in the case of this practice only because it
is a mere act – and therefore such a demonstration can proceed only from
one who has learned the art. The kinds of statements, however, are many,
some demonstrative, others not, and since non-demonstrative statements
can be adduced without knowledge of the art, it was thought that this might
also be the case with demonstrative statements; but this is a great error.
And therefore in the spheres of the demonstrative arts, no other statement
is possible but a technical statement which only the student of this art
can bring, just as is the case with the art of geometry. Nothing therefore
of what we have said in this book is a technical demonstrative proof; they
are all non-technical statements, some of them having greater persuasion
than others, and it is in this spirit that what we have written here must be
understood.7

Demonstrative statements have a formal structure, insofar as they
are the necessary conclusions of demonstrative arguments which
are technically sound and yield knowledge for the one who formed
the arguments and drew the conclusions. As Averroes knew well,
Aristotle held demonstrations to be valid syllogisms based on
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premises which are true, primary, and immediate as well as more
known than, prior to, and causes of the conclusion (Posterior Analytics, I.2, 71b18–24). Syllogisms based on invalid technical form or on
premises not meeting these criteria are not demonstrative and not
productive of knowledge, however persuasive they may be. While
demonstrations may build upon conclusions of other demonstrations, these statements based on non-demonstrative arguments may
turn out to be true, but they would be so in a merely accidental
way and not per se. For the practitioner of demonstration conclusions are necessary and known and, as such, are also persuasive; for
the practitioner of rhetorical or dialectical argument statements cannot be known to be true on the basis of the reasoning given in the
account. The syllogism used for these sorts of arguments will be a
dialectical syllogism, a rhetorical syllogism, or a sign, says Averroes
in his Long Commentary on the “Posterior Analytics,” and as such
cannot be considered altogether evident or true (al-yaqı̄n alladhı̄ fı̄
al-ghāya / secundum maximam veritatem).8 Yet, as he indicates in
the quoted passage from the Incoherence of the Incoherence, there is
no necessity that statements be demonstrative in order for them to be
persuasive.
In his Fas.l al-maqāl or Decisive Treatise, the full title of which can
be rendered, “Book of the Distinction of Discourse and the Establishment of the Relation of Religious Law and Philosophy,”9 persuasion
is explained as having to do with the movement of the soul in assent
(tas.dı̄q). Not all forms of assent are dependent in a compelling way
on the truth of the statement to which assent is given. Following
the lead of al-Fārābı̄ regarding what are called “modes of thought”
by David Reisman in an earlier chapter of the present collection,10
Averroes distinguishes human beings with respect to their native
capacities and their methods of assent:
[T]he natures of men are on different levels with respect to assent. One
of them comes to assent through demonstration; another comes to assent
through dialectical arguments, just as firmly as the demonstrative man
through demonstration, since his nature does not contain any greater capacity; while another comes to assent through rhetorical arguments, again just
as firmly as the demonstrative man through demonstrative argument.11

Nothing in dialectical arguments as such compels assent, though it
may be the disposition of a given person to be swayed by dialectical
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arguments based on assumed principles and so to assent with fullest
personal conviction to a certain statement or proposition. Likewise
in rhetorical arguments as such there is nothing to compel assent,
though it may be the disposition of a given person to be swayed
by emotive appeals and displays and, again, to assent with fullest
personal conviction to a certain statement or proposition. In these
cases assent voiced or otherwise evinced is not founded on the truth
or falsity of a statement or proposition as the criterion of its appropriateness. If the conclusion of a dialectical or rhetorical argument
happens to be true, it is not because of the argument itself but because
of extraneous considerations. The truth of the conclusions, then, has
to be considered per accidens, not per se. It is only demonstration
properly so called which attains truth with necessity in its conclusion and necessarily causes knowledge.
It is in this context that Averroes’ distinction of characters of individuals with respect to their intellectual abilities has to be understood. He does not assert that there are different truths for these
diverse classes of human beings. Those for whom the rhetorical mode
of argumentation is most fitting require the guidance of others if
they are to assent to what happens to be the truth, since neither the
premises nor the argument form as such contribute to the truth of
the conclusion. Those for whom the dialectical mode of argumentation is most fitting are those who are misled particularly regarding
the starting points and foundations of arguments; for them to hit
upon the truth in their conclusions would require the guidance of
others who in fact know the truth of the premises. There is then no
doctrine of “Double Truth” in Averroes such that religion has its
truth and philosophy has yet another. Instead, Averroes holds for a
unity of truth when he writes in his Decisive Treatise, “Truth does
not contradict truth but rather is consistent with it and bears witness
to it.”12
This principle of the unity of truth plays a central role in Averroes’
arguments, for otherwise it would be possible to hold there to be
true propositions set forth in religion by dialectical argumentation
founded on interpretation of religious scripture but which are at the
same time incompatible with true propositions set forth in philosophy founded on demonstration. Averroes does not hold for actual
incompatible truths to be present in the discourses or argued conclusions of religion and philosophy. Rather, he openly acknowledges
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that, in spite of the distinct ways assent is brought about in diverse
classes of human beings, primacy has to be given to the philosophical
method of demonstration.
We affirm definitely that whenever the conclusion of a demonstration is
in conflict with the apparent meaning of Scripture [or Religious Law], that
apparent meaning admits of allegorical interpretation according to the rules
for such interpretation in Arabic. This proposition is questioned by no
Muslim and doubted by no believer. But its certainty is immensely increased
for those who have had close dealings with this idea and put it to the test, and
made it their aim to reconcile the assertions of intellect and tradition. Indeed
we may say that whenever a statement in Scripture [or Religious Law] conflicts in its apparent meaning with a conclusion of demonstration, if Scripture [or Religious Law] is considered carefully, and the rest of its contents
searched page by page, there will invariably be found among the expressions
of Scripture [or Religious Law] something which in its apparent meaning
bears witness to that allegorical interpretation or comes close to bearing
witness.13

Moreover, philosophically established truths can be used to correct
theological excesses in scriptural interpretation such as the commonly held religious notion of creation ex nihilo and the origination
of time. In the Incoherence of the Incoherence Averroes sets forth
the understanding of the metaphysical dependence of the world on
God in accord with the account of God as creator by way of final
causality which he argues in his philosophical works. God is the creator of the universe insofar as he draws it from potentiality into the
actuality of existence and also conserves it. Such is the case without
entailing a temporal origination of the world and a starting moment
of time. God does so by being “the cause of the composition of the
parts of the world, the existence of which is in their composition,”
so that “he is the cause of their existence” and properly called agent
of the existence of the world.14 Since there cannot be two incompatible truths, in this case Averroes finds that the dialectical theologians
moved from incorrect premises in their refusal to accept the literal
account of Scripture because
in their statements about the world [they] do not conform to the apparent
meaning of Scripture but interpret it allegorically. For it is not stated in
Scripture that God was existing with absolutely nothing else: a text to this
effect is nowhere to be found.15
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Thus, Averroes holds that the truth of religion and the truth of philosophy are one and the same. In the Incoherence of the Incoherence
Averroes holds that
the religions are, according to the philosophers, obligatory, since they
lead toward wisdom in a way universal to all human beings, for philosophy only leads a certain number of intelligent people to the knowledge of
happiness, and they therefore have to learn wisdom, whereas religions seek
the instruction of the masses generally.16

Not unlike al-Fārābı̄, Averroes holds that the role of religion is the
education of human beings in proper social mores and conduct for
their fulfillment and happiness. Yet it is necessary for those of the
demonstrative class of philosophers to understand common religious
propositions critically.
We have already seen that Averroes’ account of the compatibility
of the eternity of the world and Scripture is founded on a precise
philosophical understanding of the issue. This issue of the eternity
of the world a parte ante was one of the three positions for which
al-Ghazālı̄ accused the philosophers of kufr, unbelief. The remaining two were the denial of God’s knowledge of particulars and the
denial of resurrection and the afterlife. In both cases Averroes treads
carefully in his responses, but those responses are in accord with
the methodology indicated here. To the first he responds that divine
knowledge cannot be understood on the model of human knowledge,
which both in knowing particulars and in knowing universals is posterior to things. Since divine knowledge is the cause of things, not
caused by things, the consequence is that God’s knowledge cannot
be characterized by human notions of universal or particular knowledge. In the D
. amı̄ma he holds that demonstration shows that it is
not by some originated knowledge analogous to that of human beings
that God can be said to know particulars or universals. Recognizing
the limits of inquiry on this issue, he says, “This is the furthest
extent to which purification [of concepts] ought to be admitted.”17
He later adds that
there must be another knowledge of beings which is unqualified, the
eternal Glorious Knowledge. And how is it conceivable that the Peripatetic
philosophers could have held that the eternal Knowledge does not comprehend particulars, when they held that It is the cause of warning in dreams,
of revelation, and of other kinds of inspiration?18
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This issue of God’s knowledge will be considered again below in a
strictly philosophical context. But what the careful student should
note here is that Averroes has affirmed that divine knowledge exists
and that it is the cause of things. These assertions are acceptable to
him on the basis of philosophical demonstration, as we shall see, and
they are acceptable as statements of dialectical religious discourse.
As he puts it, “demonstration compels the conclusion that [God]
knows things, because their issuing from him is solely due to his
knowing.” Yet, “demonstration also compels the conclusion that
God does not know things with a knowledge of the same character
as originated knowledge.”19 But given that divine knowledge is a
tertium quid unlike human particular or universal knowledge, “the
limits of inquiry on this issue” as dealt with here in the context
of dialectical arguments strictly preclude the explanation of exactly
what it means to say that God knows things.
Averroes’ critical interpretation of religious issues in accord with
philosophical demonstration is also found in his treatment of alGhazālı̄’s condemnation of the philosophers for denying resurrection and the afterlife (al-ma‘ād). In the Decisive Treatise he outlines his understanding of Scripture to contain three sorts of texts:
those which must be read literally, those which the demonstrative class may interpret allegorically, and those over which there
is disagreement. Scholars who err in regard to this third sort of text
should be excused because of the acknowledged difficulty and disagreement. The issue here is of the third sort. If an expert scholar
should hold for an allegorical interpretation of Scripture on resurrection and the afterlife with respect to its character (fı̄ s.ifati al-ma‘ād),
not with respect to its existence (fı̄ wujūdihi), he should be excused
“provided that the interpretation given does not lead to denial of
its existence.”20 As we shall see, in his mature philosophical work
Averroes allows no provision for continued existence after death for
individual human beings, though he does hold that human life continues for other members of the species insofar as the species itself
exists eternally. Hence, we see here again there is no question of two
incompatible truths but rather one truth which may be differently
conceived by people of the different classes of intellectual ability
and assent. Those of the dialectical and rhetorical classes may give
assent to the proposition of future life in accord with their ability
to conceive that life as one of personal immortality and continued
existence for individuals post mortem. The philosopher, however,
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gives assent to the proposition of future life, but does so without
understanding it to refer to personal immortality, simply because
the demonstrative methods of philosophical psychology yield only
the notion of a future life for the human species, not the persistence
of particular individuals.21
His argumentation for the existence of God in his Explanation of
the Sorts of Proofs in the Doctrines of Religion is founded on statements from the Qur’ān but follows the same model.22 In this work of
dialectical theology Averroes applies his own teachings on the different classes of human beings to his analysis of methods of Scripture.
Complex syllogistic explanation is not the appropriate method of
persuasion for the common folk and so is not found in the Qur’ān.
Rather, the Qur’ān’s arguments for God are rhetorical and also dialectical insofar as they are based on commonly held presuppositions of
a religious sort. The argument from providence (‘ināya) for humans
holds that the beings of the world exist for sake of human welfare
and that this must be so only by a willing agent. The Qur’ān provides
the premise and affirms the conclusion that the existing God is this
agent. The argument from creation (khalq) has the premises that it
is self-evident that animate things differ from inanimate and that
the existence of the animate requires something to provide a determination (qat. an) for life, namely God, the creator. The providential
movement of the heavens for the benefit of our world equally gives
indication of the creator. Thus, since everything created has to have
a creator, observation of the universe and our world together with
these premises yields the conclusion that God exists. For Averroes
these arguments are suitable religious arguments, and they also happen to coincide with his philosophical argumentation which holds
for a form of divine providence as well as for a form of divine creation. This understanding and also his rationalist approach to the
issues of religion can be considered to coincide harmoniously with
the rationalist elements of the theology of Ibn Tūmart, something
which may have emboldened Averroes to set forth his views publicly
in the four works discussed.23

aristotelian philosophical thought
Of Aristotle Averroes wrote, “I believe that this man was a model
in nature and the exemplar which nature found for showing final
human perfection.”24 He sought so much to follow the lead of
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Aristotle (Prior Analytics, I.32) in attempting to convert arguments
to syllogistic figures that he asserts in his Middle Commentary on
the “Prior Analytics” that all speech and discourse should be reduced
to syllogisms for critical analysis since “the nature of the reality on
which demonstration rests” is truth and its self-consistency.25 While
the effort to return to genuine Aristotelian principles is increasingly
evident in his later works on physics and metaphysics, Averroes
struggled over the years to provide coherent interpretations of texts
and issues in the works of Aristotle, employing translated works
of the Greek commentary tradition by Alexander, Themistius, and
others as aids to understanding much as do philosophers studying
Aristotle today. His best-known struggle was with Aristotle’s teachings on the intellect.
The Greek and Arabic philosophical traditions clearly saw that
Aristotle in De Anima, III.5 posited a transcendent active intellect
as a cause in the transformation of intelligibles in potency garnered
via sensation into intelligibles in act known in human understanding. Yet they were also acutely aware that Aristotle had nowhere
fulfilled his promise at III.7, 431b17–19, to return to consideration
of the receptive powers of intellect to determine whether thinking of
separate immaterial objects (intelligibles in act) is possible for human
beings when they themselves are confined to the material conditions
of body. While a complex and important issue for all thinkers of
these traditions, for Averroes the issue of the nature, function, and
metaphysical status of the receptive human power called material
intellect (following Alexander of Aphrodisias) was one to which he
returned repeatedly for refinement and development in at least five
distinct works in addition to the three philosophical commentaries
where his fullest accounts are to be found.26
In his Short Commentary on the “De Anima” (ca. 1158–60),
Averroes was under the influence of Ibn Bājja, who held that the
name, material intellect, denoted an intellectual receptive potency
with human imagination as its subject. After the external and internal sense powers apprehend the intentions (ma‘ānin) or intentional
forms of things, these particulars are received into the imagination,
a power of soul which has no need of a bodily instrument for its
activity.27 Causally established in the things of the world by way of
these intentions, these forms come to be intelligible in act through
the immaterial power of the agent intellect which exists separately
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from the soul. On this understanding, receptive material intellect is
understood as “the disposition which is in the forms of the imagination for receiving intelligibles,”28 brought to exist there thanks to
the agent intellect which thereby brings the individual to intellectual understanding of intelligibles predicable as universal concepts.
Averroes was initially so pleased with this account he called it “true”
and “demonstrative.” This notion of the imagination as the subject for the material intellect accounts for the personal intellectual
activities of each individual person. As an immaterial disposition
attached to imagination, the material intellect seemed to transcend
body and the particularity characteristic of bodily powers sufficiently
to account for the understanding of intelligibles in act.
With the appearance of the Middle Commentary (ca. 1174),
Averroes had substantially rethought his views on the nature of
imagination as a power transcending the body. Imagination is now
conceived as a power too mixed with the body to permit it to be
subject for a disposition which must be so unmixed as to be open
to the reception of any and all intelligibles without distortion or
interference. As completely unmixed, the material intellect cannot
properly be considered to have a subject which is a body or a power
in a body. Apparently using the celestial bodies, souls, and intellects
as his model, Averroes now conceives the material intellect as a disposition with the soul as subject, but with the special understanding
that it is in its subject without being in a composed union with it,
not involving the sort of composition found in the being of material
substances or accidents. Instead the material intellect is made by
the agent intellect to exist in association with each individual after
the manner of the celestial soul, which has an association with a
celestial body but exists separately. In this sense, then,
the material intellect is something composed of the disposition found
in us and of an intellect conjoined to this disposition. As conjoined to the
disposition, it is a disposed intellect, not an intellect in act; though, as not
conjoined to this disposition, it is an intellect in act; while, in itself, this
intellect is the Agent Intellect, the existence of which will be shown later.
As conjoined to this disposition, it is necessarily an intellect in potentiality which cannot think itself but which can think other than itself (that is,
material things), while, as not conjoined to the disposition, it is necessarily
an intellect in act which thinks itself and not that which is here (that is, it
does not think material things).29
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Thus, in the Middle Commentary the material intellect is a power
made to exist in immaterial association with individual human
beings by the separate agent intellect. This allows for sensed intentions intelligible in potency to be transformed by the intellectual
power of the agent intellect and deposited in individual and immaterial receptive intellects belonging to distinct human beings.
The final position of Averroes on intellect is found in his Long
Commentary (ca. 1190), where he rejects the notion of a plurality
of individual material intellects, argues for a single eternal material
intellect for all humankind, expounds a new teaching on the cogitative power, excludes human immortality, explains how the agent
intellect is “our final form” and formal cause, and establishes principles essential for his account of the hierarchical relationship of
intellects leading up to the First Cause or God. While in the earlier
commentaries Averroes was concerned over the requirement that
the material intellect be unmixed, the driving force behind his new
views is found in two key principles generated out of his concern
for the metaphysics and epistemology of the intelligibles received in
the material intellect. The first concerns the material intellect itself.
Insofar as the material intellect is “that which is in potency all the
intentions of universal material forms and is not any of the beings
in act before it understands any of them,”30 it is not possible for
the material intellect itself to be a particular or definite individual
entity (aliquid hoc or al-mushār ilā-hi), since the received intelligible
would be contracted to the particular nature of its subject, the material intellect. The material intellect then must be an entity unique
in its species. It must be an existing immaterial intellect, yet it must
also be receptive in nature. Averroes marks the unusual nature of the
material intellect by calling it “a fourth kind of being” other than
matter, form, or a composite of these.31 The second concerns the
intelligibles themselves. The problem with the accounts of the earlier commentaries was that their plurality of immaterial receptive
intellects meant a plurality of intelligibles in act without the same
intelligible being understood by each human being. If two humans
are thinking of the same intelligible, for example, a teacher and a student, then they cannot be thinking about two different intelligibles.
Indeed, a third intelligible, over and above those in their individual
intellects, would be required to explain why they are in fact thinking about the same intelligible. Consequently, it is necessary that the
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intelligible in act exist separately from particular or definite individual entities in the single transcendent material intellect shared by
all human beings.32
This new teaching on the material intellect necessitated not only
a more complex account of the relations of the agent and material
intellects but also a rethinking of the nature of individual human
knowers for Averroes. The result was the development of a more
robust account of the internal sense powers and a detailed exposition
of the role of the cogitative power (fikr / cogitatio) in the generation
of intelligibles in the material intellect as well as in the knowing of
intelligibles on the part of individual human beings. In the process
of coming to have knowledge, the perishable bodily powers of common sense, imagination, cogitation, and memory work together to
spiritualize or denude the intentions apprehended via sense of accidents and attributes extrinsic to the nature of the thing. Though
none of these are properly called intellect, cogitation can be said to
share in the powers of intellect insofar as it has the task of discerning
and separating off the extraneous before depositing the still particular denuded form in memory. This brings about the state called the
intellect in a positive disposition (al-‘aql bi-al-malaka / intellectus
in habitu). This disposition allows us to renew our connection with
the material intellect and thus to think again about something we
have thought about already earlier. The intelligibles in act or theoretical intelligibles thus attained may be said to have two subjects:
the subject of truth, consisting of the cogitative and other internal
powers of the individual soul, is cause of the intention presented to
the material intellect; the subject for the existence of the intelligible
in act is the material intellect where its existence is realized.
Even if the metaphysical natures of the agent and material intellects must be understood as distinct in existence from perishable
individuals, the powers of these intellects must be understood as
present in human souls and as essentially connected with human
rationality. Our individual voluntary effort at coming to have knowledge remains grounded in a particular intention, but is also what generates in the individual the form presented to the separate intellects
for abstraction and intellectual apprehension. This takes place when
the “light” of the agent intellect shines on the presented form and
the material intellect so as to allow for the abstraction of the intelligible from what has been presented to it and for the impressing of
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the generated intelligible on the receptive material intellect. Like the
potentially transparent medium for sight made actually transparent
by light in Aristotle’s doctrine of light and vision, the material intellect is actualized as receptive intellect by the “light” of the agent
intellect. Averroes describes this as a process in which intentions
intelligible in potency are made intelligible in act, that is, they are
“transferred” in “being from one order into another.”33 In this natural process of conjoining (ittis.āl), the agent intellect and material
intellect are united with the knower such that the agent intellect is
“our final form,” that is, our formal cause and perfection, and the
material intellect is our intellect. In this process the agent intellect
is “form for us,” both because we are the ones who individually
initiate the process of knowing,34 and also because in knowing, the
agent intellect is intrinsic to us, not something external emanating
intelligibles out of itself. In the formation of knowledge from experience, the agent intellect does not give intelligibles from its own
nature to some distinct entity, but only functions as an abstractive
and imprinting power, actualized as such only in the presence of
denuded intelligibles provided by individual human beings. Since
humans are deliberate initiators of the process of knowing, the agent
intellect is their formal cause and the material intellect is the receptive power as shared human intellect actualized in abstraction.35 Yet
the individual human knower, who is bodily and identified with the
perishable cogitative power, perishes at death, while the immaterial
separate intellects continue in their existence eternally functioning
as powers of knowing for other transitory members of the equally
eternal human species.
Averroes understood the new doctrine of the material intellect
in the Long Commentary on the “De Anima” to have important
ramifications for his metaphysical teachings in his Long Commentary on the “Metaphysics”; the two works refer to each other. In
contrast to Avicenna, who held that metaphysical argument for the
establishment of the existence of the Necessary Being begins with
consideration of primary concepts, Averroes held that the only suitable philosophical way to the existence of God is through Aristotle’s
arguments of the physics for an eternal cause of the motions of the
heavens. Since physics concerns bodies and powers in bodies, this
science which proves the existence of an eternal immaterial cause
for the motion of the universe could not include in its subject matter

Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006

Averroes

195

the nature of this immaterial entity. For Averroes, the role of philosophical psychology’s epistemological arguments was to show the
identity of intellect and immateriality in the natures of the agent
and material intellects. Thus he could conclude that the immaterial
entity reached by physics is in fact intellectual in nature. And with
its establishment of the material intellect as an incorporeal receptive potency for intelligibles, philosophical psychology also showed
that immaterial separate intellect could possess potency in some
form.
This was also used by Averroes in his metaphysics to hold for
a hierarchy of specifically distinct intellectual substances ranked
according to potency in relation to God, the First Cause and First
Form, whom he characterized as “pure actuality” (fi‘lun mah. d. un).36
While Averroes made liberal use of the language of creation in characterizing God, his metaphysical teaching expounded an Aristotelian
account of an eternal universe drawn into existence by the final
causality of the pure actuality of the First Cause, which is being in
its highest form. All other entities (including the hierarchy of immaterial intellects moving the heavens) contain some note of potency
at least insofar as their being and knowing necessarily contain reference to something extrinsic, namely, the pure actuality of being
of the First Cause. The First Cause alone contains no reference to
anything outside itself. What is more, as pure immaterial actuality
of intellect, the First Cause is the highest actuality of thought with
itself as its sole object, as Aristotle had held. As such, the knowledge of the First Cause is a noetic and metaphysical identity with
its being. As noted earlier in considering his religious dialectic, for
Averroes divine knowledge is neither universal nor particular and
as such is not to be identified with any of the modes of knowledge
known to human beings. Unlike human knowledge, for Averroes
divine knowledge is creative of things, not posterior to them. In
the context of Averroes’ philosophical thought this can be understood to mean that the actuality and activity of the First Cause as
the self-knowing pure actuality of being is responsible for its being
the primary referent for all other beings, and thereby the cause of the
existence of all beings as the ultimate final cause against which others are measured and toward which all beings are drawn. Hence, in
knowing itself, it is knowing the cause of all other beings, and it is
in the same activity causing all other beings.
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Although perhaps somewhat similar in language of dependence,
this doctrine is altogether different from that of Avicenna, who
also held God to be the highest instance of the purity of being
and actuality. While Averroes did set forth a doctrine of emanation
of a hierarchy of intellects in his early Short Commentary on the
“Metaphysics,”37 he rejected that in his mature thought in favor of
the view recounted above and also rejected the tripartite Avicennian
distinction of being into necessary in itself, possible in itself, and possible in itself but necessitated by another. Averroes objected to this
view because it allowed only the First Cause to be considered necessary in its own right. Following Aristotle, he understood the heavens
and their movers not to be possible in themselves but rather necessary beings in their own right insofar as they are not subject to corruption. In his Long Commentary on the “Metaphysics” Averroes also
rejects the Avicennian distinction between existence and essence,
insisting that Avicenna was confused by theological considerations
contaminating his philosophical metaphysics in thinking that one
and being are dispositions added to the essence of a thing, rather
than seeing man, one man, and existing man as modes of signifying
one reality.38
The works of Averroes were not widely influential in the history of Arabic philosophy, though they were appreciated by Moses
Maimonides and some were known by Ibn Khaldūn. No school of
Averroist thought arose in the Arabic tradition to continue his work,
perhaps because of his failure to gain favor for his philosophically
driven analysis of religious issues. But his works lived on in translations into Hebrew and Latin. In the Jewish tradition his translated works – the Middle Commentaries generally rather than the
Long – were studied intensely and gave rise to their own supercommentary tradition (see below, chapter 17). In the Christian West,
Latin translations of many of his Long Commentaries were available to thinkers of the thirteenth century, where they served to
play a fundamentally important role in teaching the Latins how to
read Aristotle with sympathy and insight (see below, chapter 18).
The insights of Averroes and his detailed comments on Aristotle
were initially welcomed in the Latin tradition.39 Yet with deeper
critical study and growing familiarity with and reflection upon the
texts and issues, it soon became apparent that the commentaries
of Averroes contained philosophical arguments and teachings on
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issues such as the eternity of the world and the nature of the
soul which were incompatible with Christian belief in creation ex
nihilo and the personal immortality of the human soul. Around
these issues the so-called “Latin Averroist” controversy arose in
reaction to works by Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. In
this context the much-discussed and seldom-understood “Double
Truth” doctrine often wrongly attributed to Averroes himself was
thought by Latin religious authorities to be held by certain philosophers in the Parisian Arts Faculty. This and the other issues mentioned reasserted themselves in various contexts up to the time
of the Renaissance, when the works of Averroes enjoyed a second
Latin life with new translations, for the most part from Hebrew
versions, and with the publication of printed editions of works of
Aristotle with the Commentaries of Averroes as well as other works
of Averroes.
Understood in this fashion, Averroes has generally come to be
regarded by some as first and foremost a rationalist philosopher
whose loyalty to Islam must either be based on some form of fideism
or must be disingenuous. Yet this dilemma and its dangerous horns
should be rejected for a more sympathetic understanding of Averroes
as a devotee of the most sophisticated and dominant religion of his
historical culture, Islam. A distinguished scholar and religious qādı̄,
Averroes’ devotion to Islam and its religious practices was never significantly questioned in a way prominent to historical scholarship.
Rather, it is apparent that Averroes held the world and its First Principle, God, to be through and through rational in nature, such that
human rational endeavors are understood to be the keys to the most
complete knowledge and happiness open to human beings. His philosophical thought includes important roles for religion in the development of human powers toward their fulfillment in the highest
intellectual insight into God and his creation, even as it gives critical assessment to the truth and efficacy of religious arguments and
statements.
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Tafsı̄r mā ba‘d al-t. abı̄‘a, ed. M. Bouyges (Beirut: 1949), 1497–1505;

Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006

Averroes

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24

25

26

27

28
29
30

199

Engl. trans. at Averroes [137], 108–12; Latin in In Aristotelis Opera
cum Averrois Commentariis, vol. VIII, 304rD–305vI.
Averroes [139], 57.
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